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INTRODUCTION
The atrocities experienced by the victims at the hands of their
torturers are difficult to comprehend. A wounded man survived
execution by his torturers only because the pile of bodies of those
executed before him shielded him from view.1 Assailants tortured and
raped a woman to the point that she was left immobile.2 Torturers
electrically shocked a man while he lay helpless, his extremities
bound.3 The men and women who survive these cruel acts of violence
often arrive in the United States in search of a new life, and,
sometimes, in search of a way to hold liable those responsible for this
brutality.4  However, a problem arises when the individuals
responsible do not deny their part in the violent acts, but instead
claim that they acted in their capacities as government officials, thus
entitling them to immunity from prosecution.
The Fourth Circuit had previously accepted that individuals are
entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"), a law that gives foreign states and their agencies or
instrumentalities immunity in the United States subject to certain
exceptions.6 In January 2009, however, the Fourth Circuit held in
Yousuf v. Samantar7 that the FSIA's umbrella of immunity does not
cover individual persons.8 The court specifically found that the FSIA
did not apply to Mohamed Ali Samantar, a former Somalian
government official accused of "acts of torture and human rights
* © 2010 Ashley Edmonds.
1. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., id.; Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1175 (2006).
5. See Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 402 (4th Cir. 2004) (presuming
without analysis that individuals are entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA") when acting in an official capacity).
6. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2006).
7. 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No.
08-1555).
8. Id. at 373.
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violations" under the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"). 9
Because the United States Supreme Court has held that the FSIA is
the "sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state,"' the
ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's denial of immunity to the
defendant reverberate far beyond the confines of this specific case.
The court's decision eliminates the FSIA as a potential avenue of
immunity for foreign officials sued in the Fourth Circuit, and thus
allows foreign officials to be held liable in the United States under
various laws including the TVPA. n
Five circuit courts in the United States have disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit and have held that the FSIA does grant immunity to
individual persons acting in their capacities as government officials.12
This Recent Development, however, argues that the Fourth Circuit
correctly held that the FSIA does not apply to individuals. Part I of
this Recent Development presents a background of Yousuf. Part II
subsequently discusses the FSIA and the circuit split on individual
immunity under the FSIA. Following this foundation, Part III
analyzes whether individual immunity exists under the FSIA.
Specifically, this Recent Development argues that, based on the
congressional intent implied by both the language of the statute and
its legislative history, the FSIA was not meant to cover individuals.
Next, Part IV addresses the possibility that Yousuf could have been
resolved on even narrower grounds under the TVPA alone. This
Recent Development suggests that this narrower holding under the
9. Id.; Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
10. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989). See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Construction and Application
of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 16 A.L.R. FED. 2D 563 (2007) (discussing generally
the provisions of the FSIA).
11. See Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 381.
12. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008)
("[T]he FSIA applies to individual officials of foreign governments in their official
capacities .... ); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 2002 FED App. 0019P, 7, 277 F.3d 811,
815 (6th Cir.) ("[Floreign sovereign immunity extends to individuals acting in their official
capacities...."); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380,
388 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Normally, the FSIA extends to protect individuals acting within their
official capacity as officers of corporations considered foreign sovereigns."); El-Fadl v.
Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("An individual can qualify as an
,agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.' " (quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006))); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that FSIA protection "include[s] individuals sued in
their official capacity"). But see Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006) (holding that the FSIA does not apply to
individuals and that Congress would have explicitly stated that they were included if they
had intended for them to be protected).
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TVPA would have been appropriate. Finally, Part V considers the
implications of no individual immunity under the FSIA and the
possibility of an increase in litigation for foreign officials seeking
immunity. This Recent Development concludes that-despite
potential litigation increases and the possibility of a narrower TVPA-
based holding-in light of the congressional intent suggested by the
specific statutory language and legislative history of the FSIA, the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Yousuf was proper.
I. YOUSUF V. SAMANTAR
In Yousuf, members of Somalia's Isaaq clan filed suit against a
former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Somalia now living
in the United States, Mohamed Ali Samantar, for "alleged acts of
torture and human rights violations."' 3 In the late 1960s, General
Mohamed Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council ("SRC")
seized power in Somalia by way of a socialist coup. 4 The defendant,
Samantar, was an "[o]fficer[] who had supported and participated in
the coup."'5 General Barre and the SRC tormented all clans but their
own and reserved particular cruelty for the best-educated-and
therefore, most threatening-clan, the Isaaq clan. 6 After a decade in
power, a movement in opposition to Barre and the SRC developed.17
In order to quiet the dissenters, the SRC "impos[ed] harsh control
measures against government opponents" and "terrorize[d] the
civilian population."' 8 The SRC used "torture, arbitrary detention
and extrajudicial killing against the civilian population of Somalia."' 9
Among the victims were three of the plaintiffs in Yousuf, Isaaq clan
members whom the SRC tortured, raped, shot, subjected to
unthinkable atrocities, and left for dead.2" The remaining plaintiffs
were family members of those killed by the SRC 1
The plaintiffs alleged that Samantar should be liable because in
his capacity as either Prime Minister or Minister of Defense, "he
knew or should have known about this conduct and, essentially, gave
tacit approval for it."22 Plaintiffs brought suit against Samantar in the
13. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 374.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
1450 [Vol. 88
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United States, where he fled in 1991 after the oppressive Barre
regime fell.23 The plaintiffs alleged specifically that Samantar violated
international law through his involvement in the torture and killings.2 4
They argued that these violations made him liable under the Alien
Tort Statute25 and TVPA and that the FSIA did not provide him with
immunity from this liability.26 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
plaintiffs and reversed the district court,27 holding that individuals are
not protected by the FSIA.28
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT ON INDIVIDUAL IMMUNITY
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
In 1976 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
with the goals of (1) "provid[ing] when and how parties can maintain
a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the
United States;" and (2) "provid[ing] when a foreign state is entitled to
sovereign immunity. "29 The FSIA generally provides immunity to
foreign states from jurisdiction in the courts of the United States with
certain limited exceptions. 0 The FSIA defines the terms used in its
23. Id. at 374-75.
24. Id. at 375.
25. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
26. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 375.
27. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *19 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 1, 2007), rev'd, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009)
(U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555). The plaintiffs filed the original complaint in
November of 2004. Id. In January of 2005, the Eastern District Court of Virginia stayed
the proceedings pending the State Department's submission of a statement of interest as
to whether the Department would support Samantar's argument that he was entitled to
immunity. Id. at *19-20. The court reinstated the case in 2007 after two years without
comment from the State Department and, following a hearing, granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *20-21. The district court
specifically found that individuals are entitled to immunity under the FSIA and that
Samantar is thus immune to jurisdiction in the United States. Id. at *46.
28. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373.
29. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6604.
Note that the language of the Senate Report, S. REP. NO. 94-1310 (1976), is nearly
identical to the language used in the House Report in most instances. The House Report
was selected for primary discussion because the House Report was passed by Congress
and is most commonly cited in case law. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 1, as reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604. This Recent Development will therefore only include citation
to the House Report when discussing the legislative history of the FSIA.
30. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006) (detailing
exceptions to immunity under the FSIA). Note that 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), formerly the
exception to immunity under the FSIA if a foreign state engaged in an act of terrorism,
was deleted and replaced with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006). See National Defense
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provisions, including a definition of "foreign state" that extends
immunity to an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."'"
Under the FSIA, an "agency or instrumentality" is further defined as
any entity ... (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State
of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third
country.32
Thus, the FSIA's umbrella of immunity includes not only the
foreign state itself but entities connected to the state deemed agencies
or instrumentalities by statute.33
In the FSIA's definition of what constitutes an "agency or
instrumentality," however, it is unclear, at first blush, whether an
individual person may constitute an "agency or instrumentality. '34
The FSIA does not explicitly state whether the term "person" refers
to a natural person or a "person" in the corporate sense of the word.3 1
For this reason, courts have had to interpret whether individuals are
entitled to immunity under the FSIA. It is this ambiguity that gave
rise to the issue addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf.
B. Background on the Fourth Circuit's Split from Other Circuit
Courts
In Yousuf, the Fourth Circuit broke from the holding of several
other circuit courts and joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that the
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44.
This new terrorism exception is inapplicable in the context of Yousuf, as it states that it
applies only if the foreign state at issue has been "designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism at the time the act described ... occurred." 28 U.S.C.A § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)
(West 2008). Currently, only four countries have been designated as state sponsors of
terrorism by the United States government: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. See U.S.
Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/cl4l5l.htm
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id.; Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1175 (2006) (noting that it is unclear whether Congress intended "legal person" to
mean an individual as opposed to a corporate person). In Enahoro, the court noted that
the phrase" 'separate legal person' "suggests the "familiar legal concept that corporations
are persons, which are subject to suit." Id.
1452 [Vol. 88
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FSIA does not grant immunity to individuals.36 Until 2005, when the
Seventh Circuit in Enahoro v. Abubakar3 became the first circuit
court to hold that the FSIA does not apply to individuals,38 circuit
courts generally followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Chuidian v.
Philippine National Bank.3 9 In Chuidian, the court found the terms
used in the FSIA to be "ambiguous as to its extension to individual
foreign officials."'' 4  Thus, the court "decline[d] to limit its
application."41
In Chuidian, the Ninth Circuit held that a Philippine citizen's
actions while working in his capacity as a member of the Philippine
Commission on Good Government were entitled to "be analyzed
under the framework of the [FSIA]," meaning that if he qualified for
immunity, he was entitled to it under the FSIA in his individual
capacity.42 Much like the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf,43 the court based
its decision largely on the legislative history of the FSIA-but
reached an entirely different result.
The Ninth Circuit relied on a portion of the FSIA's legislative
history which states that one objective of the law is to "transfer" from
the executive branch to the judicial branch the ability to make
36. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555) (stating that it finds "the Seventh Circuit's view"
interpreting the phrase "separate legal person" as referring to corporate persons
"especially persuasive"); see also Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881-82 (stating that Congress
would have been more clear had it meant to include individuals).
37. 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006).
38. Id. at 881-82.
39. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990); see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
40. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101.
41. Id.; see also Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 2002 FED App. 0019P, J 7, 277 F.3d 811,
815 (6th Cir.) (citing Chuidian and concluding that the defendants were individuals
covered by FSIA immunity); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A.,
182 F.3d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting the reasoning in Chuidian). In Byrd, the Fifth
Circuit focused more on whether individuals were acting in their official capacities and less
on whether FSIA immunity extended to those individuals to begin with. See Byrd, 182
F.3d at 388. The court in Byrd accepted and adopted Chuidian without much analysis. See
id.; see also EI-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing
Chuidian in finding that an individual qualifies for immunity). In EI-Fadl, the D.C. Circuit
accepted as a rule that individuals may fall under the FSIA. El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 671; see
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103 ("[S]ection 1603(b) can fairly be read to include individuals
sued in their official capacity." (citation omitted)).
42. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103.
43. The Fourth Circuit based its decision in Yousuf largely on the legislative history of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555). Contrary to the
Ninth Circuit in Chuidian, the Fourth Circuit found that the legislative history of the FSIA
suggests that Congress intended it to apply to only corporate and other entities and not to
individual persons. Id.
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immunity decisions." The court stated that the FSIA was enacted
"largely [to codify] the existing common law of sovereign
immunity.... [and to] remove the role of the State Department in
determining immunity. ' 45 Common law immunity prior to the FSIA
reflected a "restrictive view of sovereign immunity" that included
within its umbrella of protection individuals performing in their
official capacities.' Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, the FSIA must
protect individuals.47
This reasoning, however, ultimately ignores both the substantive
section of the FSIA that defines the terms "agency or
instrumentality" in corporate terms and the section of the legislative
history that expounds on that definition by giving examples of
corporations and entities that would qualify as agencies or
instrumentalities without mentioning a single example of a qualifying
individual person.48  The Ninth Circuit did acknowledge the
"significant support" for excluding individuals from FSIA immunity
drawn from that section of the legislative history, but dismissed it.49
The court stated that while individuals may not have been expressly
included within Congress's definitions of "agency or instrumentality,"
neither were they expressly excluded." The court then expressed the
inference that "[i]t would be illogical to conclude that Congress would
have enacted such a sweeping alteration of existing law implicitly and
without comment."" Without factual support, the court assumed that
simply because something was not explicitly excluded from the FSIA
it was therefore implicitly included under the FSIA's protection. This
logical jump was made in the face of the explicit language in the
legislative history listing corporate entities as the only examples of
agencies or instrumentalities, and thus the Ninth's Circuit's logic must
be read with the caveat that there exists evidence supporting an
alternate outcome. The court further stated that "Itihe most that can
44. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606
("A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer determination of sovereign immunity from
the executive branch to the judicial branch ... .
45. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
46. Id. at 1099-100; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 66 (1965) (including individuals such as officials and agents of the state under the
immunity umbrella).
47. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103 (concluding that FSIA protection "include[s]
individuals sued in their official capacity").
48. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
49. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
50. Id. at 1101.
51. Id. at 1102 (referencing how, under the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law, individuals acting in their official capacity were entitled to immunity).
1454 [Vol. 88
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be concluded ... is that the Act is ambiguous as to its extension to
individual foreign officials," and thus the court refused to "limit its
application.""2
The government in Chuidian contended that declining to extend
to individuals FSIA protection would not result in "sweeping
alteration[s]" to the landscape of sovereign immunity because such
individuals would still be covered by common law immunity.53 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument and, in doing so,
once again emphasized the legislative history and Congress's stated
intent to minimize the State Department's role in immunity
decisions. 4 The court noted that the application of common law
immunity to such individuals would involve State Department
decision making,55 a result seemingly contrary to Congress's stated
purpose of transferring decision making "from the executive branch
to the judicial branch."56 Contrary to the government's contention,
the Ninth Circuit did not believe common law immunity-which
required State Department intervention-provided the same
protection as judicially-policed FSIA immunity.57
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision essentially holds that the terms
in the FSIA are "ambiguous" as to the issue of individuals based on
(1) the absence of explicit language excluding individuals and a
finding that it defies logic that Congress would alter common law
immunity principles for the FSIA; and (2) Congress's intent to relieve
the State Department of its role in immunity decisions. The circuit
split set the stage for the Fourth Circuit's consideration of individual
immunity under the FSIA and its ultimate rejection of the Ninth
Circuit's analysis.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN YOUSUF WAS PROPER
Yousuf provided the Fourth Circuit with the opportunity to
examine the same statutory language and legislative history explored
by the other circuits and come to its own conclusions regarding the
existence of individual immunity under the FSIA. The language and
legislative history of the FSIA show that the Fourth Circuit properly
52. Id. at 1101.
53. Id. at 1102.
54. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6606 (stating that a primary purpose of the bill is to "reduc[e] the foreign policy
implications of [executive branch] immunity determinations").
55. See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102.
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606.
57. See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102-03.
2010] 1455
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decided that the FSIA does not protect individuals. First, the phrase
"separate legal person," selected by Congress as part of its definition
of the term "agency or instrumentality," signals a corporate meaning
as opposed to an individual meaning, and the term's placement in a
corporate context in the text is a further indication of the corporate
connotation of the word.58 Second, the legislative history states in
explicit terms what falls under the definition of a "separate legal
person," including examples of corporate organizations and similar
entities, but not mentioning natural persons. 9 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit was correct to hold in Yousuf that the FSIA does not apply to
individuals.'
A. Language and Structure of Statute
In Enahoro, the court placed significant weight on the use of the
phrase "separate legal person, corporate or otherwise" in the FSIA
and noted that the phrase brings to mind only corporate
connotations, as opposed to references to individual persons.61 The
Fourth Circuit found the Seventh Circuit's decision in Enahoro to be
persuasive.62 After reviewing the Seventh Circuit's interpretation, the
Fourth Circuit then delved even further into the statutory language
than the court in Enahoro by considering the FSIA requirement that
the " 'entity' " not be "created under the laws of any third country"63
and, in agreement with the court in Enahoro, concluding that such
58. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006).
59. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613-14.
60. It is important to note that in making its decision in Yousuf, the Fourth Circuit
distinguished its prior decision in Velasco v. Government of Indonesia where it stated, but
did not explicitly hold, that "[cllaims against the individual in his official capacity are the
practical equivalent of claims against the foreign state." 370 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citing Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101). The Fourth Circuit distinguished its decision in
Velasco from Yousuf by stating that, in Velasco, the court was concerned with whether
"the acts of an individual operate to bind a foreign sovereign claiming immunity under the
FSIA" as opposed to whether the FSIA applies to individual government officials. Yousuf
v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 379 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (U.S. Sept. 30,
2009) (No. 08-1555). In Velasco, the court accepted, without much discussion or
consideration, that individuals are entitled to immunity under the FSIA when acting in an
"official capacity." Velasco, 370 F.3d at 398 ("(C]ourts have construed foreign sovereign
immunity to extend to an individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign
state."). After making that assumption, the court then held that "the act of an agent
beyond what he is legally empowered to do is not binding upon the government." Id. at
399. The court did not hold that individuals are entitled to FSIA immunity. See id. at 402.
61. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
1175 (2006).
62. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 380.
63. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3)).
1456 [Vol. 88
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language, like the phrase "separate legal person," "' ring[s]' " of a
corporation and not of a natural person.'
From the Supreme Court down to district courts, opinions
regarding various areas of law have commonly used the term
"separate legal person" in a corporate context.65 Courts have also
referred to individual, natural persons as "separate legal persons" in
certain non-corporate contexts. 66 However, in the FSIA, the
likelihood that "separate legal persons" was meant to refer to
corporate persons is further corroborated by the phrase that follows
in § 1603(b)(1): "separate legal person, corporate or otherwise."67 The
placement of the phrase "separate legal persons" in an explicit
corporate context makes a strong case for the conclusion that
Congress intended a corporate meaning for the phrase. Further, while
no appellate court has addressed the plain meaning of "separate legal
person," the Southern District of New York has held that the phrase's
plain meaning references an entity.' It is commonly used in reference
64. Id. (quoting Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881-82).
65. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946)
("[N]o violence to the legislative purpose is done by treating the corporate entity as a
separate legal person."); Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Ala. & Ga. Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188, 199
(1905) (stating that two corporations remained "two separate legal persons"); State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Newburg Chiropractic, P.S.C., No. 3:06-CV-281-S, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4589, at *18 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 21, 2010) (indicating that after incorporated entities
began doing business, they no longer existed as the defendant owner himself, but issued
bills as separate legal "persons"); Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., 351 F. Supp. 2d
74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("It is elementary that a corporation is a separate legal person from
its officers.").
66. See Braga v. Genlyte Group, Inc., 420 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (using "separate
legal person" to refer to an individual within the very specific context of the definition of
the "dual persona doctrine," whereby in an employment context an employee can have a
separate persona unrelated to that of his employer); see also Gordon Sel-Way, Inc. v.
United States, 2001 FED App. 0382P, T 35, 270 F.3d 280, 290 (6th Cir.) (using "separate
legal person" in a specific bankruptcy construct whereby a debtor can wear dual hats as
"debtor" and "debtor-in-possession" in the context of the debtor-creditor relationship).
Note that each of these "individual" uses of the phrase "separate legal person" retains a
corporate undertone though they are being used in an individual context (i.e., the
separation of a person from his employing company and the separation of a person into
both a debtor and a debtor-in-possession).
67. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1) (2006)
(emphasis added).
68. See Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The plain
meaning of [separate legal person] is an entity that can function legally independent of the
state."). The plain meaning definition of separate legal person arose in the context of
determining whether a Finnish Bank qualified as an agency or instrumentality of the
government of Finland under the FSIA. Id.
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to corporate entities,69 and here, that common use is bolstered by the
placement of explicit corporate references directly following the
phrase "separate legal person" in the FSIA. °
Additionally, while neither the FSIA's legislative history nor case
law provide any explicit guidance regarding the meaning of the
phrase "or otherwise" on its own, in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,71
the Supreme Court considered whether the FSIA's language allows
for disregarding corporate formalities when determining if an entity is
entitled to immunity.72 The Court noted in Dole that the entire phrase
"separate legal person, corporate or otherwise" as a whole is
indicative that "Congress had corporate formalities in mind" and
concluded that "[t]he text of the FSIA gives no indication that
Congress intended us to depart from the general rules regarding
corporate formalities."73 This suggests that the Court did not consider
the phrase "or otherwise" to have a meaning separate from and
beyond its corporate and organizational meaning. Thus, based on the
language and structure of the statute, the Fourth Circuit properly
found the phrase "separate legal person" suggestive of corporations
and not natural persons.
B. Legislative History and Purpose of the Statute
The legislative history74 of § 1603 of the FSIA is rife with
corporate references while at the same time completely devoid of
69. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp., 326 U.S. at 437; Riverdale Cotton Mills, 198
U.S. at 199; Mazda Motors of Am., Inc. v. MV Cougar Ace, 565 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir.
2009).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) ("An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means
any entity ... which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise . (emphasis
added)).
71. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
72. Id. at 474. As will be discussed in Part III.B infra, the legislative history includes a
list of examples of qualifying agencies or instrumentalities that consists solely of different
corporate entities, organizations, and agencies. When Congress uses the phrase "corporate
or otherwise" in this context, it appears to reference these different types of entities-
"corporate or otherwise." For example, in the House Report, one example of a qualifying
entity is a "ministry which acts and is suable in its own name." See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487,
at 15-16 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614. Such a government ministry
would likely not be an incorporated entity, but is still an entity covered under the FSIA.
See id.
73. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 474, 476.
74. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613-
14. The legislative history of the FSIA includes Congress's purposes for the FSIA and
additional definitions of terms used in it, including a definition of "agency or
instrumentality" that consists entirely of corporate references. See id.
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references to individual natural persons.15 In the House Report
addressing the history, purposes, and intent of the FSIA, the House
explicitly defined "separate legal persons" as various types of
corporate entities and organizations.76 According to the House
Report:
The first criterion, that an entity be a separate legal person, is
intended to include a corporation, association, foundation, or
other entity which, under the law of the foreign state where it
was created, can sue or be sued in its own name, contract in its
own name or hold property in its own name.77
The report gave a list of examples of "entities which meet the
definition of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.' "Is Each
and every example listed is a corporate entity, organization, or
agency.79 The House legislative history further states that "[a]n entity
which does not fall within the definitions [in § 1603 of the FSIA] ...
would not be entitled to sovereign immunity in any case."80
The notion that with its chosen language Congress intended
immunity solely for governmental corporate entities and
organizations is further supported by the legislative history for the
TVPA, in which the Senate Report references the FSIA in
determining who may be liable under the related TVPA.s1 The FSIA
and TVPA are related because the TVPA provides for a cause of
action for acts of torture that applies only to individuals, and if
individuals are included under the FSIA's immunity umbrella, they
could potentially be immune from prosecution under the TVPA. 2 As
such, in its report, the Senate plainly makes a critical distinction
between the TVPA and the FSIA.83 The Senate states that
75. See generally id. (addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1603 of the FSIA solely in corporate
contexts).
76. Id. at 15, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 15-16, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
79. Id. The list of entities protected under the FSIA includes: "a state trading
corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a shipping line or airline,
a steel company, a central bank, an export association, a governmental procurement
agency or a department or ministry which acts and is suable in its own name." Id.; see also
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006)
(addressing how the court was "troubled" by the holding in Chuidian that Congress, by
not excluding individuals, "therefore... included" them).
80. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
81. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991).
82. See id.
83. Id.
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[t]he [TVPA] uses the term "individual" to make crystal clear
that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill
under any circumstances: only individuals may be sued.
Consequently, the TVPA is not meant to override the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act... which renders foreign
governments immune from suits in U.S. courts .... 14
This shows that Congress understands the FSIA to not apply to
individuals, as Congress distinguished the TVPA, which explicitly
does apply to individuals,85 from the FSIA on that exact basis. Thus,
based on two separate legislative histories, it appears Congress
intended the FSIA to apply only to corporate-type entities, and not to
individual persons.
C. The Ninth Circuit Ignored Probative Evidence in Holding that the
FSIA Applies to Individuals
While the Ninth Circuit declined to limit the FSIA's application
to only corporate entities and organizations, it also declined to hold
explicitly that the FSIA applies to individuals.86 In declining to
explicitly hold that the FSIA applies to individuals, and by stating
that, at best, it could conclude only that "the Act is ambiguous as to
its extension to individual foreign officials," the court is hedging on its
conclusion.87 The court diluted its holding by finding the FSIA
"ambiguous" and finding that limiting the FSIA to corporate
organizations and similar entities would be "inconsistent with the
purposes of the Act."88 As the Fourth Circuit disagrees with the Ninth
Circuit and the circuit courts that joined it, and as several circuit
courts relied on the Ninth Circuit's holding in coming to their
respective conclusions, it is significant that the Ninth Circuit qualified
its conclusion in this way.89
The Ninth Circuit made two main arguments in finding that the
FSIA applies to individuals.' The first argument involved a finding
that the FSIA's legislative history does not explicitly state that
individuals are excluded from its protection-thus meaning that they
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)) (stating that the TVPA applies to "[an
individual").
86. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095,1101 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380,
389 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Chuidian reasoning).
90. See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101-02.
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must be included-and concluded that for Congress to have intended
otherwise would be "illogical." 9 This reasoning is weakened by the
fact that the legislative history explicitly includes only non-
individuals. 2 While the Ninth Circuit is correct that the FSIA is
ambiguous in the sense that it does not explicitly define "separate
legal person," the legislative history clarifies this ambiguity by
couching the phrase in entirely corporate terms.93 The Ninth Circuit
itself, in fact, correctly rejected the defendant's argument in Yousuf-
that the FSIA's reference to "separate legal persons" includes
individuals 94-by accepting that "Congress was primarily concerned
with organizations.'"9'
The Ninth Circuit's second argument, that Congress intended to
shift immunity decision-making power from the executive branch to
the judicial branch, is more persuasive than its first argument.96
Unlike its first argument, the logic behind its second argument is
based on a stated purpose of the FSIA as illuminated by the
legislative history.' The legislative history does suggest that Congress
intended to minimize the role of the State Department in immunity
decisions and that leaving such decisions to common law immunity-
where the State Department assists the court in determining
immunity by filing statements of interest-would give the State
Department a role in determining whether to confer immunity on
individuals.98 The Ninth Circuit considered the fact that the State
Department would still have a dispositive role in deciding that the
FSIA must also apply to individuals.99 However, in removing the
State Department from immunity decisions regarding business
entities and organizations, Congress delegated a significant portion of
the State Department's former immunity decision making to the
91. Id.
92. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6614 (citing only non-individual entities as examples of things protected under the
FSIA).
93. See supra Part III.B (addressing in detail the legislative history that defines
"separate legal person" in entirely corporate terms).
94. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 17, Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th
Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1893) (arguing that the FSIA applies to individuals), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555) see also Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 375 (discussing
defendant's argument for individual immunity under the FSIA).
95. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101.
96. Id. at 1101-02.
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605-06.
98. See id. ("A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch.").
99. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102-03.
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courts under the FSIA, which is consistent with the purpose of the
FSIA emphasized in Chuidian. Further, in 2004, the Supreme Court
held in Republic of Austria v. Altmann1" that in the context of FSIA
immunity decision making, "nothing in [its] holding prevents the
State Department from filing statements of interest."'0 1 The Court
further stated that if the State Department chose to express its
opinion, "that opinion might well be entitled to deference as the
considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of
foreign policy."10 2
Additionally, the State Department has not been entirely
removed from immunity decisions. First, and most important, the
State Department has continued to issue statements of interest to the
courts with regard to whether persons should receive immunity even
after the FSIA was enacted. 103 Second, the State Department is still
tasked with making all decisions regarding diplomatic and consular
immunity, in addition to being responsible for requesting waivers of
immunity where necessary." Finally, both the State Department and
the Department of Justice have asserted that the FSIA does not apply
to individuals and that, instead, individual, natural persons can find
immunity under pre-FSIA common law.'05 Thus, while it should be
acknowledged that Congress intended the FSIA to reduce the State
Department's role in immunity decision making, it does not
necessarily follow that this intent required that individuals be
included in the FSIA. As such, in focusing on Congress's intent to
reduce the State Department's role, the Ninth Circuit dismissed other
probative evidence in the legislative history that points toward the
opposite conclusion that Congress did not intend for individuals to be
protected by the FSIA.
100. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
101. Id. at 701.
102. Id. at 702; see also Mark J. Chorazak, Note, Clarity and Confusion: Did Republic
of Austria v. Altmann Revive State Department Suggestions of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity?, 55 DUKE L.J. 373, 390 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court's recognition in
Altmann of the State Department's ability to submit statements of interest).
103. See Erin Nelson, Comment, Does an Individual Foreign Official Qualify as a
Foreign State for Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
853, 875 & n.141 (2008) (citing recent State Department statements of interest regarding
FSIA immunity decisions).
104. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR IMMUNITY:
GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES (1998) (providing,
through an instructional manual, guidance with regard to the intricacies of diplomatic and
consular immunity).
105. See Nelson, supra note 103, at 875.
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IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING COULD HAVE BEEN EVEN
NARROWER
The Fourth Circuit, in holding that Samantar was not entitled to
immunity, based its decision on its view that the FSIA does not apply
to individuals. However, had it so chosen, the Fourth Circuit could
have come to the same result on even narrower grounds. In Yousuf,
the plaintiffs sued Samantar under the TVPA.0 6 The Fourth Circuit
could have found Samantar liable based solely on the TVPA, a law
providing a cause of action for torture victims against their assailants,
as even if Samantar had successfully argued that individuals acting in
their official capacity are protected under the FSIA, Somalia has no
recognized central government capable of sanctioning his actions as
official state actions.1"7 This provides further support for the argument
that the FSIA does not protect Samantar and defendants like him
since they can be brought to justice on narrower grounds without
having to show that the FSIA does not apply.
The TVPA was enacted with the goal of creating "a Federal
cause of action against any individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation, subjects any
individual to torture or extrajudicial killing."' 8 The TVPA generally
"authorizes the Federal courts to hear cases brought by or on behalf
of a victim" subjected to such torture or killing."0 9 While it is not a
jurisdictional statute,"0 it derives original jurisdiction from the Alien
Tort Statute, of which it is a part.' The Alien Tort Statute states that
106. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49
(U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555).
107. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
108. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 2 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 84-85.
The TVPA was Congress's way of "legislatively ratif[ying] the judicial decision in Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which recognized federal subject matter
jurisdiction over claims by aliens under the Alien Tort Claims Act for official torture or
extrajudicial killings committed in violation of the law of nations." James L. Buchwalter,
Annotation, Construction and Application of Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 199
A.L.R. FED. 389, 403 (2005) (discussing the provisions of the TVPA generally). The Alien
Tort Claims Act is also known as the Alien Tort Statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
109. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N at 87.
110. A jurisdictional statute is one that provides for jurisdiction itself, as opposed to
deriving jurisdiction from another source. See, e.g., Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 274 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[J]urisdictional statutes 'speak to the power of
the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.' " (quoting Republic Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992))).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also Kadic v. Karad.i, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Though the Torture Victim Act creates a cause of action for official torture, this statute,
unlike the Alien Tort Act, is not itself a jurisdictional statute. The Torture Victim Act
permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the jurisdiction
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"[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.""' 2 The question is whether
the TVPA provides a cause of action for victims of torture against a
defendant like Samantar that FSIA immunity cannot override." 3
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit mentioned the TVPA only
twice: (1) when it noted that the plaintiffs allege Samantar's liability
under it, and (2) when it briefly addressed jurisdictional issues."' The
TVPA was enacted to "provid[e] a civil cause of action in U.S. courts
for torture committed abroad.""' The House Report does state that
the TVPA must abide by the FSIA.16 However, it continues further
and states that while the TVPA must comply with the FSIA,
"sovereign immunity would not generally be an available defense.""' 7
The Senate Report expounds on this by stating that "the committee
does not intend these immunities to provide former officials with a
defense to a lawsuit brought under this legislation.""18 Further,
because no foreign states officially endorse torture or extrajudicial
killing, the Senate Report concludes that "the FSIA should normally
provide no defense to an action taken under the TVPA against a
former official.""' 9 Thus, although the TVPA must comply with the
FSIA by virtue of the subject matter that the TVPA concerns-
torture committed overseas-the FSIA will in all likelihood provide
no immunity for former officials that commit acts of torture.
Hypothetically, even if the FSIA did apply to former officials-or
even individuals more broadly-in order to be covered by the FSIA,
the individual's actions would have to be sanctioned by the foreign
conferred by the Alien Tort Act and also under the general federal question jurisdiction
....."). See generally Philip Mariani, Comment, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between
the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1437
(2008) ("[I]t is most appropriate for courts to interpret ... [the] interaction between the
two statutes as fundamentally supplemental rather than preclusive.").
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
113. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991). The Senate Report acknowledges that "the
TVPA is not meant to override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ... except in
certain instances." Id. However, it continues further to state that in spite of this, "the
committee does not intend [head of state or FSIA immunity] to provide former officials
with a defense to a lawsuit brought under this legislation." Id. at 8.
114. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555).
115. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4.
116. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88.
117. Id. Note that both head of state and diplomatic immunity would still be available.
Id.
118. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 8.
119. Id.
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state to which he or she is connected, and, at least according to the
Senate Report, all states oppose torture.
12 0
In Yousuf, the plaintiffs alleged that Samantar, a former
government official, was liable for approving--or at the very least
implicitly approving-the torture and killings that occurred in
Somalia.' The TVPA provides the cause of action.2 2 In the
appellee's brief, Samantar does discuss letters that the Acting Prime
Minister of Somalia of the Somali Transitional Federal Government
("TFG") wrote on his behalf stating that Samantar acted in his
official capacity.123 Plaintiff-Appellants in their brief questioned the
validity of such letters and argued that the TFG was not in a position
to "ratify" Samantar's actions to avoid liability. 124 The district court
nonetheless found these letters to be dispositive and dismissed the
case on the theory that these letters provided Samantar with
immunity under the FSIA. 125 However, in doing so, the district court
recognized the TFG-a government that has not been officially
recognized by the United States because Somalia has not had a
central government since 1991.126 The Fourth Circuit did not mention
the letters and instead came to the broader holding that the FSIA
does not apply to individuals in general.127 The court's broader
holding that the FSIA does not apply to individuals regardless of the
presence of ratification letters allowed it to avoid addressing the issue
of the transitional government and the letters.
Had the Fourth Circuit been forced to consider the- issue of
whether the letters on Samantar's behalf qualified him for immunity
under the FSIA, instability and the lack of any true, recognized
120. Id.
121. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555).
122. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)) ("An individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation-(1) subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an
individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the
individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for
wrongful death.").
123. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 94, at 2-3.
124. See Brief of Appellants at 22-23, Yousuf, 552 F.3d 371 (No. 07-1893).
125. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *35 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 1, 2007) ("These letters are entitled to 'great weight' and persuade the Court that
dismissal is appropriate."), rev'd, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49
(U.S. Sept. 30,2009) (No. 08-1555).
126. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Somalia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgn/2863.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
127. See Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 381.
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central government in Somalia would have made it difficult for the
court to consider the letters that came from the TFG as dispositive of
the issue. In 2005 the Supreme Court affirmed an Eighth Circuit
decision that specifically recognized the fact that "Somalia lacks a
central functioning government."'" The United States also has no
official representation in the country. 29  Somalia's transitional
government does not satisfy the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law's definition of a "foreign state," which courts have
stated is the proper test for determining foreign statehood. 30
According to the Restatement (Third), "a state is an entity that
has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control
of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities.' '31 The TFG,
created in 2004, was Somalia's fourteenth attempt at creating a
central government in the last decade. 32  It was ultimately
unsuccessful, as there are currently two "regional administrations" in
existence in northern Somalia in addition to the TFG-the "Republic
of Somaliland" and "Puntland."'33 Each region even has its own
president.3 4 Thus, the Restatement (Third)'s definition of a "foreign
state" is not satisfied-the TFG does not have government control of
the "defined territory" or "permanent population" of Somalia as
required by the Restatement (Third)'s definition.'35
The failure of Somalia to qualify as a foreign state would have
allowed the Fourth Circuit to find-based solely on the TVPA-that
Samantar was not entitled to immunity. Even assuming that the FSIA
applies to individuals, the letters written on Samantar's behalf
claiming to ratify his actions as official state actions came from one
unrecognized transitional government in a country with multiple
128. See Jama v. INS, 329 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 2003), affd, 543 U.S. 335 (2005).
129. U.S. Department of State, supra note 126.
130. See, e.g., Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir. 2005)
(stating that since the FSIA has not defined "foreign state," it must determine the
meaning of the term, and concluding that the Restatement (Third)'s definition is proper
and universally accepted); Kadic v. Karadli, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing the
Restatement (Third) and stating that the definition of a foreign state is "well established in
international law").
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987).
132. U.S. Department of State, supra note 126.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201; see also Ungar,
402 F.3d at 289-92 (finding that defendants failed to prove that Palestine is a foreign state
under the "Restatement test" because the government in power did not have sufficient
governmental control over the territory).
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governments. Such letters, which seem unlikely to constitute a
foreign-state sanction under the FSIA, would be insufficient to
qualify Samantar for immunity from prosecution.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF No INDIVIDUAL IMMUNITY UNDER THE FSIA
If immunity for individual actors no longer attaches under the
FSIA, foreign officials responsible for horrific acts of torture will not
be able to hide behind a cloak of immunity under the FSIA. Victims
like the individuals in Yousuf who were subjected to unbearable
tragedies will have the ability to pursue causes of action against those
responsible for the crimes against them. Without FSIA immunity,
foreign officials who would otherwise have easily been granted
immunity under the FSIA will have to revert to avenues of immunity
used prior to the codification of the FSIA, such as relying on the State
Department for immunity and engaging in litigation while they wait
for the State Department's decision. 36 For example, in its pre-FSIA
decision in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes,3 7 the Second Circuit stated:
A claim of sovereign immunity may be presented to the court
by either of two procedures. The foreign sovereign may request
its claim of immunity be recognized by the State Department,
which will normally present its suggestion to the court through
the Attorney General or some law officer acting under his
direction. Alternatively, the accredited and recognized
representative of the foreign sovereign may present the claim of
sovereign immunity directly to the court.'38
If applied to individuals in post-FSIA cases, Victory Transport
would suggest that, if the FSIA provides no immunity to individuals-
removing the possibility of a "representative of the foreign sovereign
... present[ing] the claim" via a letter or otherwise-the remaining
option for claiming immunity lies with the State Department.'39
136. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964).
137. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
138. Id. at 358. See generally E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as
to Immunity of Foreign Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R. 3D 322,
330 (2008) ("[C]ourts have quite naturally deferred to the policy pronouncements of the
State Department.").
139. See Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 358; see also Compania Espanola De
Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75 (1938) ("This Court has
explicitly declined to give [suggestions of immunity that do not come from the State
Department] the force of proof or the status of a like suggestion coming from the
executive department of our government.").
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Two recent cases provide examples of individuals who, without
the individual protection of the FSIA, would be required to wait for a
State Department decision on their qualifications for immunity.14° In
Belhas v. Ya'Alon, 41 the court found that an Israeli general was
"entitled to the FSIA presumption of immunity" when the
government of Israel wrote a letter on the defendant's behalf stating
that he had taken part in "state-approved attacks" that occurred
during a conflict with Hezbollah. 142 In Matar v. Dichter,143 the court
found that the defendant, the former director of an Israeli
government security organization, was "entitled to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA" because of a letter from the Israeli
government stating that he was acting in the "furtherance of official
policies of the State of Israel."'" Because the courts in both these
cases operated under the assumption that the FSIA applied to
individuals, the letters from the Israeli government, a recognized
central government, were sufficient to apply immunity to the
defendants under the FSIA and to dispose of the causes of action
against them. 45 However, if immunity for individuals no longer
existed under the FSIA, these individuals would have had to take part
in litigation and await the decision of the State Department to grant
them immunity. 146 Thus, without the protection of the FSIA,
defendants such as those in Belhas and Matar would be required to
pursue this alternate manner of seeking immunity.
Disallowing individual immunity under the FSIA eliminates an
avenue of escape for individuals whose victims want to sue for often
140. See Belhas v. Ya'Alon, 466 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing a letter
written on defendant's behalf by the Israeli government ratifying the defendant's actions),
affd, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing a letter written again by the Israeli government ratifying the
defendant's actions), affd, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009). From these facts, it appears that the
individuals involved in each case were participating in clear government-sanctioned
actions and were rightfully granted immunity.
141. 466 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2006), affd, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 131.
143. 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).
144. Id. at 291.
145. See Belhas, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 129; see also Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d, at 291 (holding
that the defendant was entitled to immunity as his actions were sanctioned by the Israeli
government).
146. See Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S.
68, 74-75 (1938) (addressing the State Department's role in immunity decisions); see also
Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15-16 (2d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the court's prior
holding that the FSIA applies to individuals and affirming the district court's ruling that
the government official in this case was immune, but noting that it did not have to decide
whether the FSIA applies to former government officials because they might be entitled to
immunity "under common-law principles that pre-date, and survive... the FSIA").
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abhorrent and detestable actions. Instead of automatically being
granted immunity under the FSIA, such individuals would have to
request immunity from the State Department. 147 This avenue by no
means guarantees success. First, the State Department might decline
immunity.148 Second, it can elect not to respond to requests for
Statements of Interest on immunity issues, effectively denying
immunity. 149 Third, the State Department can request that immunity
be waived for individuals who should qualify but whose actions
warrant prosecution. 5 ° Thus, eliminating FSIA immunity would make
it more difficult for such individuals to escape prosecution and more
likely that individuals who deserve to be prosecuted would have to
face the consequences of their actions under the laws of the United
States.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit properly held in Yousuf v. Samantar that the
FSIA does not apply to individuals. The language of the statute and
its legislative history point to Congress's intent that the FSIA apply
only to corporate entities and other such organizations. 5' Had the
Fourth Circuit so chosen, it could have held on narrower grounds
that-even assuming that the FSIA applies to individuals-the TVPA
on its own was sufficient to bring a cause of action against the
defendant.152 This potential for a narrower holding not only bolsters
the argument that the FSIA must not apply to individuals, but it also
keeps open an important avenue of litigation for torture victims who
hope to bring their tormenters to justice under the TVPA 3 The
exclusion of individuals from immunity under the FSIA, while proper,
will likely result in an increase in litigation as foreign officials who
may have been granted immunity under the FSIA will have to pursue
claims of immunity through other avenues, such as through the State
Department, and in the interim, participate in litigation of the matters
147. Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S.A., 303 U.S. at 74-75.
148. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 n.22 (2004) ("We note that
the United States Government has apparently indicated to the Austrian Federal
Government that it will not file a statement of interest in this case.").
149. See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 04-1360, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *20 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 1, 2007) (discussing the two years that proceedings were stayed in the district
court while awaiting a State Department statement of interest that never came), rev'd, 552
F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1555).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 456 (1987).
151. See supra Part III.
152. See supra Part IV.
153. See supra Part IV.
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related to their actions abroad. 54 However, the Fourth Circuit's
decision is preferable and worth the cost of additional litigation in
certain situations, as it gives victims of heinous crimes the chance to
hold their tormenters accountable for their actions while at the same
time preserving a means of seeking immunity for those who are truly
entitled to it.
ASHLEY EDMONDS
154. See supra Part V.
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